On the value of human life...

Over at Pharyngula, PZ is beating up Starbucks over one of the quotes on their cups. The quote is by Discovery Institute fellow Wesley Smith, and it reads:

The morality of the 21st century will depend on how we respond to this simple but profound question: Does every human life have equal moral value simply and merely because it is human? Answer yes, and we have a chance of achieving universal human rights. Answer no, and it means that we are merely another animal in the forest.

There are some good reasons to doubt the wisdom of selecting a quote by this particular author, but I think that the quote also can serve to frame the real issue underlying the abortion, stem cell, and other similar debates.

Over at Uncommondescent, Sal Cordova is pointing to the inclusion of the quote as a bit of a victory for ID, saying,

Although Smith's quote is outside ID proper, one can conceive of it as a quote reflective of the values of many in the pro-ID community.

What Sal doesn't seem to get is this: the quote is also very much reflective of the values of many - if not most - in the anti-ID community. In fact, it's reflective, I think, of the values of a huge majority of Americans. That's probably why it was picked for the cup - the only real reasons to object to it involve a pre-existing knowledge of Wesley Smith's background and positions on various issues.

The people who support abortion and stem cell research are, by and large, no more opposed to the concept that every human life has equal moral value than those who are against those things. Planned Parenthood is not populated by people who enjoy killing babies. Stem cell researchers don't think that the world's newest humans can be killed with impunity for medical research purposes. People hold different positions on these issues not because they have different views of the value of human life, but because they have different opinions on just when human life begins. That is the question that divides us, and that is the question that needs to be addressed.

More like this

The Discovery Institute is in Seattle (?)
Starbuck's started in Seattle (?)
???

FYI
When Wes Smith talks about a human life, he means simply a living human organism. And though one could argue the point, it is reasonable to claim that a zygote formed from a human oocyte and sperm is, indeed, a living human organism, albeit very, very early stage.

Smith would contrast his stance from the claim common among bioethicists that it's being a _person_ rather than being a human that confers moral worth. The fact that a lot of development has to take place before a human organism becomes a person explains why Smith is so strident in his opposition to what he calls personhood theory in bioethics.

By bob koepp (not verified) on 01 Sep 2006 #permalink

Bob: That is more or less my point, just phrased somewhat differently.

I think that the distinction between "human" and "person" is more semantic than substantive in this case - that is, the "personhood" bioethicists are arguing that the transition from a living thing that might become human to a "real" human occurrs somewhere during development, but not at fertilization.

As far as Smith's own position is concerned, I think that a "humanity starts at fertilizaion" position is not all that reasonable. Given that there is a measurable degree of uncertainty at the time of fertilization as to how many humans will be produced from that particular event, and given that a very substantial proportion of fertilized eggs fail to implant, I have difficulties seeing how that definition could be supported. In effect, pre-implantation definitions suggest that something that can, given the right circumstances, become one or more people is in fact a human being.

As Smith uses the terms, 'human' and 'person' are not interchangable. He uses 'human' as a strictly biological classification. And he views any talk about developmental stages as a diversion, since at any stage of development beginning with the zygote, we're dealing with an organism that's human (rather than, say, bovine). 'Person', on the other hand, is not at all a biological classification. It incorporates notions of agency that could apply to non-humans -- and more importantly, there are clearly humans who are not persons (e.g., infants, PVS patients, etc). Smith is proud to call himself a speciesist precisely because he thinks being a member of our species is sufficient to fully qualify an organism as a bearer of rights.

I think he's flat out wrong about this, but he's not playing "semantic games" with 'human' and 'person.'

By bob koepp (not verified) on 01 Sep 2006 #permalink

If you look, you will see that I did not say that he was playing semantic games. I said that I thought that the distinction was more semantic than substantive. Smith, in effect, is arguing that anything that is biologically Homo sapiens is fully "human" and deserves all of the rights that come with being human. The "personists," in effect, believe that developing embryos become fully "human" at a later stage of development. In either case, however, the debate is not really over whether or not every "human" should have the same rights, but about when someone becomes "human." Using terms like "person" simply clouds that issue.

You know, if I look at that "profound question", all by its lonesome, disregarding the author and all of that (and also disregarding that it's been slapped on a disposable coffee cup), I'd answer, "No."

Mike -
I'm not trying to argue a point, just explaining how Smith is using certain terms. Just out of curiosity, would you also claim that neonates, imbeciles, PVS patients, brain-dead patients, et al., are not humans?

By bob koepp (not verified) on 01 Sep 2006 #permalink

A person's experience will impact how they read the statement. I've been an activist in the death penalty abolition movement for six years, so when I read it, my first thought was, 'Yes, so let's abolish the death penalty.'