Tit-for-tat

Dr. Myers, after noting that a mere 1% of Americans things God is a chick (compared to 36% who think he's a dude), writes about Muriel Gray's idea to rebrand what once were called freethinkers (or Brights, or …) as Enlightenists:

Enlightenists believe in the awe-inspiring, wonder, beauty and complexity of the universe, and aspire to unpick its mysteries by reason, constant questioning, observation, experiment, and analysis of evidence. The bedrock of our morality is empathy, from which logically springs love, forgiveness, tolerance and a profound desire to make a just, egalitarian society and reduce suffering. The more knowledge a person has, the more they question and understand the real world, and the more they are required to analyse what is true then the greater the increase in empathy. Enlightenists care and wish to do good not because a vengeful God tells them to, but because intelligence suggests it is the only and the right thing to do.

Indeed, a better name for this approach might be Pragmatists, were the name not already taken by a philosophical movement with the same basic principles. The fact that Gray is apparently unaware of (or uninterested in mentioning) the intellectual history of the idea she's propounding is, perhaps, merely a sign of the times. Richard Dawkins managed to write an entire book about the limits (or lack thereof) of science without mentioning Karl Popper.

I think that Dewey's approach would be substantially more helpful than the more tit-for-tat approach being advanced. The Pragmatic (or instrumentalist) approach advanced by Dewey, Henry James and others in the early 20th century made a distinction between two types of knowledge (I'm relying in part here on an excellent lecture that Barbara Forrest gave last spring at KU about ID creationism and her own research in Pragmatist Sidney Hook). On one hand we have share experiential knowledge, of which science is but one example. For instance, our understanding of a novel may be individual, but the novel itself is empirical, and can be discussed on that empirical basis.

On the other hand lies individual knowledge, including religious knowledge obtained through personal revelation. That knowledge is not empirical and cannot be shared between people. This is part of why the reaction to Dawkins' book has been so polarized. Some people just agree, and others just don't. Empirical evidence alone cannot tell us which camp is right and which is wrong.

Dewey's solution was to say that policy, especially educational policy, ought to be built around our shared experiences. Whether or not our political views draw on personal revelations, the policy ought to rest on a firm empirical foundation. Of course, the distribution of beliefs in society is empirically testable, and values shared across a society certainly enter into good policymaking.

In educational policy, this led to Dewey's advocacy (and experiments at the U. of Chicago Lab School) in teaching approaches that relied on direct experimentation, rather than dogmatic memorization. This contrasts neatly with religious education, but unfortunately also with almost all public and private school classrooms. Dewey was a supporter of public education in part because he wanted to encourage these sorts of shared experiences, to ground everyone in society in our shared reality. Balkanizing schools limits those opportunities.

(Click through to find out how The Simpsons figures into this).

And that is why Dr. Myers is right to object to further Balkanizing the public schools by creating "Enlightenist" schools. Create pragmatist schools, and help people understand the world we all share, don't further divide society. Dr. Myers writes:

I'm not enthused about that—anything that takes resources away from the public schools is not a good thing in my book—but the idea that we freethinkers ought to be lobbying more is a good one.

Again, I agree, but for different reasons.

i-01a8a880fae7cf17b84ed75028e62768-doleabortionsforall.jpg
To understand, let's explore a different debate. Let's begin with a Simpson's moment. Kang, dressed as Bob Dole, addresses a crowd:

Abortions for all. [crowd boos]
Very well, no abortions for anyone. [crowd boos]
Hmm... Abortions for some, miniature American flags for others.

And everyone is happy.

In modern political life, no one adopts the first position (genocide), but people do adopt the second ("pro-life"). This makes it seem like the third position (pro-choice) is extreme, since it represents the extreme of political discussion. If there were people adopting position 1, it might make it easier to find a satisfactory compromise.

But no one would (or should) advocate abortions for all. It's foolish. The pro-choice position is that the government shouldn't be making arbitrary decisions about complex moral issues that people have genuine disagreements about. They no more support forced abortion than they support forbidding abortion.

I see religion the same way. If your beef is that religious groups are too aggressive in pushing their dogma into public policy, then the solution is not to increase the amount of dogma in that debate. The solution is to fight for non-dogmatic policies, policies that protect everyone's right to believe what they choose, and to root those policies in rational analysis of empirical data and our shared values as a society.

And it just so happens that there already are groups established to lobby for those ideals. Yes, it means adopting a nuanced position, and rejecting the framing of the fight as one between religion and anti-religion. It means constantly explaining that the problem is with public policies that interfere with anyone's right to believe (or not). That this is an approach that aims to protect atheists, agnostics, apathists, animists, deists, theists, unitarians, trinitarians, Taoists, Muslims, Jews, Christians, Christian Scientists, Christian scientists, and everyone else. That isn't how people see the fight, so it won't be an easy project.

But it can succeed. While abortion policy remains a hot topic, the number of people who identify themselves as pro-choice has been steadily rising. There are disagreements among the pro-choice about what limits should be placed on abortion, about the acceptability of certain procedures and notification regimes. Despite that, there is a growing consensus that the basic question of whether a woman can have an abortion is one that is hers to make in consultation with a medical professional. It isn't what Kodos would say, but it can work.

More like this

Richard Dawkins managed to write an entire book about the limits (or lack thereof) of science without mentioning Karl Popper.

Karl Popper wasn't the be all, end all of philosophy of science. He was responsible for some significant improvements in our understanding of empirical reasoning, especially that justification in science was always tenuous and provisional. But many notable thinkers have called into question much of his thought, and his name is generally associated with "naive falsificationism".

Even so, one can agree with Poppers entire philosophy and still agree with Dawkins on "The God Question". Popper's whole philosophy of critical rationalism is centered around the idea that we should be open to new ideas and consider them on their merits. Drawing a distinction between "personal experience" and empirical evidence doesn't get us anywhere in that regard. I see no reason why my ephemeral subjective experiences should be taken as evidence for theological conjecture and not ESP, UFOs and other such bunk (and some people have, just read Terence McKenna), as your vaunted pragmatist school of though seems to suggest.

If you think a certain phenomena in nature exists, you test it. Dawkins whole point is that God is a scientific proposition, as it can't avoid making claims about the natural world without rendering itself devoid of cognitive content. Subjective experience is good for music, poetry, art, etc., but no good for investigatory purposes.

And furthermore, most religious people don't take it that way. The majority of theists will probably tell you that theism is perfectly rationalism and will probably also say that science points to God. I think in this situation I have a right to say "no, it doesn't".

By Tyler DiPietro (not verified) on 01 Nov 2006 #permalink

Perhaps I'm misreading your post, or perhaps I'm misreading your commenters. Perhaps both: it's early and the caffeine hasn't yet kicked in. But as I see it, Josh's point here is not about the philosophy of science per se or whether Barbara Forrest is a scientist. It's about how to strike a balance in school curricula between, as Josh puts it, shared and subjective knowledge. So, even though a certain sort of theist is absolutely convinced that God has a material reality and exists in and interacts with and indeed has created nature in scientifically-measurable ways, s/he, unless delusional, would have to confess that not everyone--not even other theists--agrees with those propositions. To thereby call his/her worldview subjective does it no injustice, he must confess, unless s/he wishes to quarrel with the writer of Hebrews (11:1: "Now faith is the conviction of things hoped for, the conviction of things not seen."). Is that not the obverse of science?

At any rate, this has already become too long, so I'll just conclude that I see this post as a thoughtful and reasonable corrective to Dawkins. Thanks.

"The majority of theists will probably tell you that theism is perfectly rationalism and will probably also say that science points to God. I think in this situation I have a right to say "no, it doesn't"."

Fine, so long as you don't object when I say the same to you.

While Popper's basic form of falsificationism has been left behind, the sort of logical positivism that Dawkins advances remains entirely rejected. What philosophers of science argue now is that, while falsification (at least potential falsifiability) is still a core characteristic science, it can be difficult to conduct a single experiment that could only falsify one hypothesis (rather than a hypothesis or one of its auxiliary hypotheses).

If Dawkins wanted to mention any philosopher of science who agreed with his views, that would be better than what he did, which was to mention none. He ignored a long and serious discussion because, for the last century, it's been going against him.