Nation Building versus Nation Rebuilding, part 3

Last week, I wrote two posts on the differences between nation building and nation rebuilding. Toward the end of the second, I said this:

I think that a large portion of the problem here is not that we don't have the capability to do enough, but that we have not organized our capabilities in a way that would ease this type of process. As things currently stand, military-based nation building efforts are the worst way to provide comprehensive, broad-based improvements in war torn nations - except for pretty much all the others that have been tried. The military really does have some significant advantages in such situaitons - a broad variety of capacities (engineering, medical, logistic, etc) to use in rebuilding efforts, the ability to provide at least some security and counter-insurgency assistance, the ability to provide a wide range of training, etc. The problem is in the way that these capabilities are organized more than anything else, I think. More on that later.

In the comments, Yakov said this in response:

Why have we "not organized our capabilities in a way that would ease this type of process?" I think this is exactly what the insurgents end up interfering with, even if we tried to organize our military for it. The military is the bull in the pottery barn, and if we pull it back to the point where it does no harm, it isn't in a position to help or protect the menders. Those who seek to worry the bull do not meet it head-on, they encourage it to range into disadvantageous terrain where it can be attacked.

I think the reason we have not "organized our capabilities in a way that would ease this type of process" is that the reward structures in place are not designed to promote it. Lots of people are making lots of money off of this war, and politically, it has been very good for its proponents. As it starts looking more and more like a losing proposition, the money and resources will start to dry up, rather than be diverted into wiser and more helpful ideas. This war wasn't arranged by altruists.

With travel and family obligations, I haven't had much of a chance to respond to that until now.

Let's start with the basics - the current organization of the military as opposed to the type of organization that would be better for facilitating reconstruction efforts.

It should come as no surprise to anyone that the military is presently organized with winning wars as the primary goal. That's the traditional purpose of any military, after all, and it's what we've mostly planned on using our own military for throughout the entire history of our country. A military that's built around the primary goal of conventional arms combat tends to have a certain structure to it. The core of the force is made up of combat arms troops - infantry, artillery, armor, etc - with other kinds of units - transport and logistics, combat engineers, medical units - attached as necessary to support the combat force. That works well for fighting wars, but it makes things a bit awkward when it comes to supporting reconstruction efforts.

When a choice is made to use the military to support nation building efforts, there are basically two choices available. A conventional force can be deployed, or selected support units can be pulled and sent. Neither is optimal. If a conventional force is deployed, a large portion of the force will represent people who are going to basically be untrained labor for the purposes of the rebuilding itself. The combat arms guys are very well trained for what they do, but a tank driver's training doesn't apply quite as well when it comes to restoring a water supply. On the other hand, deploying selected support units also creates problems. First of all, if the support units are being sent to someplace where there is a security risk, then having at least some combat arms types available for protection isn't all bad. Second, if you are pulling the support units from different combat units, you may be throwing people together who haven't been training together. That's not a huge problem, of course, but neither is it optimal. Finally, pulling the support units leaves the combat arms folks who have been left behind without their own support, which means that should a military emergency develop, they won't be in a good position to go fight - and that is a real concern, too.

What would be optimal for nation building/reconstruction efforts, I think, would be having a few military units available that are planned out and optimized with that as their primary purpose. Such a unit would have a much higher ratio of "support" to "combat" troops, and, more importantly, would train with that mission as their primary focus. More specifically, they would train on the tasks needed to repair a badly-damaged country and they would train up on the skills needed to train the people in that country to pick up the work. There's actually some precedent for this in the US Army - in some ways, this would be similar to what Special Forces A-Teams were designed to do, but on a larger scale and with a little more of a civilian focus.

In cold, hard terms, I think that doing something like that would be in our best interests. The military might not be intended to be a nation building force, but they've been asked to do just that over and over again during the last few decades. Having a small number of units that are devoted to that task would be a more efficient solution in terms of costs and time.

As far as whether or not it would be a good thing overall, I think it clearly would be. The US military might not be a very well-loved institution, but there is nobody else on the planet capable of bringing a large number of well-trained and well-equipped people to bear on a problem in a short period of time. There are, of course, plenty of NGOs in the world who do great work, and any nation-building/reconstruction efforts should involve them as well, but the military can put together a well-integrated effort that includes its own security forces and logistics chain in a matter of a few hours, and sustain it for years if necessary. That's nothing to sneeze at.

More like this

Would soldiers and officers in the nation-building specialized units have the same promotion opportunities as, e.g., speical forces or combat infantry?

I don't dispute that help is desparately needed, or that the military has tremendous logistical capabilities. If we ever decide that it is a primary job of the military to build nations, then optimizing our capabilities towards nationbuilding may happen. But the change in mission required to do that isn't anything that seems remotely close to possible. We may have asked the military to do nationbuilding excercises several times, and pragmatically, we'll probably have to do so many times more, but nationbuilding won't be a central mission for our military anytime soon.

The authors of this GWOT/GSAVE debacle would fight it bitterly as 'welfare for foreigners', our majors and generals will still advance from combat backgrounds, and as we look to assign blame for what went wrong in Iraq, politicians will blame it on noble but misguided nationbuilding fantasies.

Having trained nationbuilders might indeed be a more efficient solution, if the goal is doing nationbuilding. But I don't think that was a pre-war goal--much of the pre-war criticism predicted these difficulties and what little planning there was for post-war was neglected. What we have accomplished is a very efficient transfer of government funds and power into the military and executive. Do you see any serious indications that this administration has any goals beyond that?

I like the idea of having specialist units that are trained and dedicated to nation-building, but I tend to think, as Yakov implies, that in the status-conscious military realm, those units would be perceived as second-class units. They might not get the best people. Then again, they probably would not get the sociopaths, either.

Yakov is right about the pre-war planning. In Bush's first meeting of the National Security Council (February 2001, months BEFORE 9/11) there was an agenda item: Planning for Post-Saddam Iraq. This indicates that there was plenty of planning, but it turned out to be bad planning. The goal was to enrich American oil compnanies, and to "Rebuild America's Defenses," according to the PNAC plan. Nation rebuilding was not considered.

Even so, if the military had such units available, they could have been brought in later, when it became obvious that the primary mision was a failure. That would have been, or cold have been, extremely helpful.

Joseph -- Such nation-building specialist units probably would get excellent people for the task, but I think they would not be supported up the chain of command. Any officer that devoted significant effort to the nationbuilding mission would likely be passed over for promotion. Nationbuilding will always be viewed as a distraction from the military's main mission of defense, and will get passed over for funding, be the first part of the budget to get trimmed, have its soldiers redeployed to combat units, and it will be a career-killer for officers.

Even though it would indeed be very helpful, the very idea of nationbuilding is almost antithetical to the philosophies of those running the military. How much of this administration opposes nationbuilding even here in the US?