Or just found lying around, according to an anonymous package containing the source code for their voting machines on a disk. That package was sent to Cheryl Kagan, a former Maryland legislator who has been a critic of computer voting machines. These systems are remarkably easy to manipulate and it really is important that there be a paper trail to validate the results, at the very least.
More like this
A couple of weeks ago, I posted a link to a rather humorous video that asked what would happen if Microsoft had designed iPod packaging.
My mother uses Lancome for skin and make-up. I use Lancome. I sense Lancome knows that brand inheritance helps build brand loyalty. They also make very nice products, which helps. But Lancome is about to lose me as a customer.
All these sets of knowledge were laid out before me, like packages tied in brightly colored papers and curling ribbons, each as enticing as the last.
But, as the video that you posted some time ago showed, sometimes that's not even enough.
I strongly urge anyone who lives in state where these machines are being used, and who has the option, to vote absentee. I did. It'll cost you a couple of first-class stamps, but what's that?
Electronic voting machines are black boxes and thus wholly untrustworthy. Without a ballot box full of actual physical ballots, there is no conceivable mechanism that could provide a recount that anyone can trust if a recount were needed--and they will be. I think the best use of the Deibold (and the other) machines is as artificial reefs or large paper weights unless they can be cheaply adapted for use a inexpensive PCs.