Francis Darwin, that is, son of Charles and editor of his correspondence.
In Life and Letters of Charles Darwin, volume I, Francis reprinted a number of letters of Darwin's on the issue of religious belief, and in a footnote, he noted the following:
Dr. Aveling has published an account of a conversation with my father. I think that the readers of this pamphlet ('The Religious Views of Charles Darwin,' Free Thought Publishing Company, 1883) may be misled into seeing more resemblance than really existed between the positions of my father and Dr. Aveling: and I say this in spite of my conviction that Dr. Aveling gives quite fairly his impressions of my father's views. Dr. Aveling tried to show that the terms "Agnostic" and "Atheist" were practically equivalent—that an atheist is one who, without denying the existence of God, is without God, inasmuch as he is unconvinced of the existence of a Deity. My father's replies implied his preference for the unaggressive attitude of an Agnostic. Dr. Aveling seems (p. 5) to regard the absence of aggressiveness in my father's views as distinguishing them in an unessential manner from his own. But, in my judgment, it is precisely differences of this kind which distinguish him so completely from the class of thinkers to which Dr. Aveling belongs.
What is interesting about this is that it was Edward Aveling, who was Marx's son-in-(common) law, who wrote to Darwin asking for his approval to dedicate the volume A Student's Darwin the year before Darwin died (1881), not Marx himself who asked for permission to dedicate Das Kapital as the myth has it. John Lynch debunks that one. Aveling was what one might call an aggressive atheist, and like a number of freethinkers in the period he tried to insist that Darwinian theory required that one was an atheist.
Darwin himself, though, declined the offer, and in his correspondence, he expressed repeatedly that he was neither a theist (though he had been one when the Origin was first written) nor an atheist, but that instead that
I cannot pretend to throw the least light on such abstruse problems. The mystery of the beginning of all things is insoluble by us; and I for one must be content to remain an Agnostic.
Now I'm not trying to stir up the flame war that periodically graces these blogs, nor am I arguing from authority, but it is clear that a distinction between atheism and agnosticism has been drawn in pretty much the same manner since 1887, when this volume was prepared. So there ...
Note: See also this site for the text of the letters to Aveling and Marx.
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Yeah, but the distinction isn't in what they think, but that the agnostics won't admit that that's what they think. That's also clear in the quote — a distinction not in substance, but in assertiveness.
That's fine, but you have to admit that this is the kind of attitude that gets agnostics a reputation for wishy-washiness.
So, no matter what they say they believe or not, you won't believe them. I mean us. Basically, you have a solid line into our heads...
I find myself duly chastened by your and CD's moderation and must put aside all unworthy thoughts of kicking some atheist butt...
That would be the wishy-washiness involved in the unwillingness to pronounce certainty on what we do not (and cannot) know.
Now, what other group is careful to make that distinction ...
I'm a contrast both to Paul's assertive style of atheism, and also to the agnosticism of John and Charles.
I'm an atheist. In fact I'm a "strong" atheist, by which I mean not merely that I lack a belief in God, but that I am persuaded that there is no God. I think there are good reasons to be confident that God does not exist. In that sense, I do assert that there is no God.
In this, I am clearly different from Mr Darwin, who says "I cannot pretend to throw the least light on such abstruse problems". Unlike Darwin, I think there are good reasons for confidence that there is no God, so I am NOT an agnostic.
On the other hand, I don't carry assertiveness to the extreme shown by Paul. Paul goes well beyond assertions about God's existence, and into assertions about what other people believe.
For example, I don't make independent assertions about Darwin's beliefs. I am willing to take Darwin at his word and not merely presume he's being coyly dishonest; I recognize that Darwin and I truly have different views on the matter of God's existence.
I also recognize that what I consider to be persuasive is not going to persuade every other rational thinker. My position is not simply a matter of empirically falsifiable scientific models, nor of formal mathematical deductions. I bring to bear also some metaphysical considerations, such things as reductionism; complex phenomena are a consequence of how constituent parts interact, even though we may lack the capacity to model the interactions in full detail.
The upshot is that I am a strong atheist, but one who can recognize integrity and rationality in people who don't share my disbelief.
Cheers -- Chris
I've always wondered if the distinction that I understand exists between agnostics and atheists is different here in Mexico from the one in the U.S. (or other parts of the world for that matter).
For me, an atheist is someone who thinks/asserts/believes/etc, that God *does not exist*; while an agnostic is someone who claims he doesn't/can't/etc *know*. I've considered myself an agnostic for a while now, and I totally agree with Chris. I understand that there's evidence that may persuade someone else that God doesn't exist, but may not be persuading enough for me.
My doubt came from the fact that I've been finding a lot of blogs of self-proclaimed atheists, but none of self-proclaimed agnostics, which seemed strange to me for some reason (maybe I'm biased, who knows).
Any comments on this?
Errm, no. I'm not claiming to know better than you what you think. I'm also not suggesting that agnostics lack integrity or rationality -- quite the opposite, I think they're just as rational and have as much integrity as I do, since they've fundamentally come to the same conclusion I have, that there is no evidence for the existence of gods.
I am saying, and the quotes you've put up there support me on this, that the difference is more one of style than substance. Atheists are people who disbelieve in gods and don't hesitate to announce it. Agnostics are people who disbelieve in gods and are more reserved in their pronouncements.
And good grief, I certainly don't think there's anything coy or dishonest in what Darwin or Wilkins have said about the subject, nor am I trying to imply that there is.
Sorry John, I didn't realise until now that you're agnostic (presumably about physicalism too). Anyway, at the risk of looking even more incompetent and incoherent, may I POINT OUT (assertively) the existence of an agnostic who DOES believe in a god? My agnosticism springs from reflection upon epistemology and the nature of our public language. I can't prove that the object of my theistic beliefs is indeed a god (and not a mirage etc.), but neither am I sure what is meant by 'god' in our public language anyway. So I certainly claim the title of 'agnostic' (e.g. I know that I don't know nearly enough about others' beliefs about such things to begin to rule any religion out of the possibilities), although I do believe in the existence of what I can only call a 'god' (following certain experiences that would be hard to describe let alone reproduce).
We've been over this ground before but just for the record here's my 2 cents (Cdn).
Like Richard Dawkins, I'm an atheist and an agnostic. There are some people who believe in God who are agnostics. They are theists and agnostics. Saying you're an agnostic doesn't tell be diddly squat whether you behave as though God(s) exist or you behave as though they didn't.
Some people refer to themselves as agnostics when they clearly mean that they don't believe in God but just want to avoid the word atheist. Perhaps we could refer to these people as "agnostic unbelievers" in order to distinguish them from "agnostic believers." I'm not sure why we need a new term since the word "atheist" simply means than one has failed to be convinced about the existence of God.
In my experience, there are quite a few atheists who want to avoid the "atheist" label because it has negative connotations. Lots of people will automatically assume that you are an "aggressive atheist" instead of a quiet, passive atheist. Some of these people don't want to offend their loved ones who may not be prepared to follow them down the path of non-belief. I understand that. If your spouse, for example, is religious, it may be more acceptable to use the word "agnostic" to describe your position. At least then the spouse can still hold out hope that you aren't a real atheist.
So, saying someone has a reputation of "wishy-washiness" isn't an attack on the integrity or rationality of the person? Is it when you call people "Chamberlain Appeasers"?
Do the same rules apply when someone gets called a (small "f") "fundamentalist atheist"?
I have to agree with PZ on this, but only in the sense that most people (not everyone) who use the label "agnostic" use it in this way.
While there may be some people who take the (frankly, very peculiar) position that it is in principle impossible to know whether God exists but still choose to believe, for most part those who call themselves agnostics not only do not know, they also do not believe. Or, to use Larry Moran's terms, I'm fairly certain that the overwhelming majority of agnostics are agnostic unbelievers, not agnostic believers. Insofar as they lack belief in the existence of God(s), all such agnostics are by definition also weak atheists.
That such agnostics do not wish to call themselves atheists does seem primarily to be a matter of attitude - of not merely choosing to be non-confrontational, but actively avoiding the potential for confrontation. After all, one can call oneself an atheist and never seek out any confrontation at all. But if one avoids calling oneself an atheist even though one is in fact an atheist in the most common sense, then one is doing something more than simply not starting confrontations - one is trying to avoid being confronted by others. In my opinion, that does carry a substantial whiff of lacking the courage of one's convictions.
On the other hand, there is a perfectly legitimate reason for someone who takes the difference between weak and strong atheism to be very important (as I do not) to avoid the label "atheist." While every agnostic unbeliever is also a weak atheist, the agnostic unbeliever need not be a strong atheist - and so might want to avoid the label "atheist" to avoid confusion with strong atheists.
Having said that, in my experience most people who choose the label "agnostic" don't have such principled philosophical reasons for the making the distinction. Usually, they're just being evasive and wishy-washy. Hence my finding it whiffy.
I think there is a genuine substantive difference between the views of most people who describe themselves as agnostic, and the views of most people who describe themselves as atheist (weak sense, if it matters).
A self-declared atheist is usually someone who takes a kind of default position on God. They don't see any reason for taking the notion seriously. A few might go further and supply reasons for saying God does not exist (strong atheism) but others simply note that the proper onus is on someone asserting existence of a putative entity. Give me reason to believe; otherwise I won't. And you haven't given me any reasons. An atheist usually dismisses the reasons proposed by theists for belief in God as worthless.
A self-declared agnostic is usually someone who considers that God is a different kettle of fish to an arbitrary entity for which no evidence is given. It might be that they think there is some reason to consider God seriously, but insufficient reason to make a solid case. They may adopt a more subtle perspective on putative Gods than is offered by fundamentlist theology, and consider the more abstract notions of academic theology as something to consider seriously. But it usually boils down to recogizing God as a seriously possibility for which there is currently insufficient evidence available to them to resolve the matter of existence.
As a kind of analogy, suppose you are shipwrecked, and washed up on a small Pacific island. You have no idea whether or not there are mice on the island. It's a serious possiblity on which you have to suspend judgement for the time being. You're pretty sure there are no lions. There's a bit of mopuntainous jungle in which lions might conceivably hide, but it's the kind of thing for which you'd actually actually need some reason to take seriously. Absent any reason, you ignore the possibility. You're quite positive that Santa Claus is not on the island.
I'd say that the agnostic position tends to fit the uncertainity concerning mice; weak atheism fits the disbelief concerning lions; strong atheism fits the confidence of no Santa Claus.
I think the word games with definition of "weak atheist" as a basis for calling agnostics "wishy-washy" is a superficial avoidance of a real substantive difference that leads people to legitimately prefer to identify themselves as agnostic rather than weak atheist. Atheists who call agnostics "wishy-washy atheists" are failing to understand a consistent perspective with a real substantive difference from their own position. It's an insulting phrasing, and inaccurate.
Cheers -- Chris
Wow, G! That hit just about every nerve possible. I sure hope you were doing it on purpose because the alternative is not pleasant to contemplate.
Out of curiosity, why is it "weak" and "strong" atheists instead of "non-dogmatic" and "dogmatic"?
What ability do you have (that even PZ doesn't claim) to know better than others what they think that enables you to discover that so many people are just being evasive and wishy-washy, instead of merely disagreeing with you?
And just what conviction should a person who thinks it is impossible to know whether there is or is not a god have the courage of?
Very well put Chris! Thanks!
Darwin simply seems to have been using agnostic for 'weak atheist' and atheist for 'strong atheist'. I just wonder what word he would've used to describe 'agnostic'; as I see it, a term for one who believes that the truth value of a particular statement is impossible to get knowledge of is kind of practical.
John Pieret:
Because there's nothing dogmatic about the belief that there are no gods, and because the claim that it's not reasonable to believe that there are gods is weaker than the claim that it's reasonable to believe that there are no gods (in that the former follows from the latter but not the other way around).
No, John Pieret, I'm not just deliberately poking at nerves. The reason I very carefully stated my position in terms of "most" agnostics is to allow that there are also people who can and do make the subtle distinctions such as the ones offered by our esteemed host and Chris Ho-Stuart above. But in my experience, those aren't the most common motivations for calling oneself an agnostic: It's my impression that most people who call themselves agnostics do so because baldly calling oneself an atheist makes one a target for the usual knee-jerk anti-atheist bigotry everyone with their eyes open sees all around us.
And I don't claim any special insight: I've just talked to a lot of people who call themselves variously agnostics, atheists, questioning, unbelievers, freethinkers, etc. about their beliefs. My opinion is based on those conversations. I never claimed to know better than others what their own opinions and motivations are. I've simply asked them - many people, many opinions, on many occasions. And in those conversations, I've encountered many, many people who call themselves agnostics, who are also in fact weak atheists (carefully defined below) and say as much when it is defined, and who admit that they just don't like to be associated with atheists for various sorts of emotional or social reasons that aren't particularly philosophical or principled (unlike the reasons offered by John and Chris). I admit that my evidence is purely anecdotal, but there's lots of it.
And the terms "dogmatic" and "non-dogmatic" are completely separate from "strong" and "weak." In fact, they are tendentious terms which are almost always used to denigrate rather than describe. Weak atheism is characterized simply by the lack of belief in the existence of any deity or deities. Such belief is usually grounded in the absence of evidence. Some people also believe that there is also evidence of absence, not just absence of evidence. Strong atheism is the positive belief that there are no gods in the universe, period. For example, I believe not only that the evidence and arguments offered for the existence of god(s) is unconvincing, I also believe that the evidence we have about the way the universe is structured goes against the existence of all the usually conceptions of god(s). I also believe that there is more than ample evidence that conceptions of god(s) are purely human inventions with all sorts of motivations and causes which have nothing to do with the truth or even plausibility of their existence.
In the case of either weak or strong atheism as just explained and defined, however, you will note that the conclusion for not believing in the existence of god(s) (or having a positive belief about the non-existence of gods) is based upon evidence and reasoning, not simple declaration or choice. Basing one's conclusions upon evidence and arguments of course allows the possibility of new evidence or better arguments coming along - that is, it implies fallibilism rather than dogmatism. Atheism (of either form) is not a matter of faith, but of reason and argument - and therefore to call it "dogmatic" is both erroneous and insulting.
I'll grant the possibility that there are genuinely dogmatic atheists out there, people whose beliefs are not based on any consideration of evidence, who've never believed but also never even really asked the question or considered any evidence and arguments either way. But I've never personally encountered such a person.
I do not favor the term "Chamberlain appeaser" and only use it ironically. I also use wishy-washy ironically -- in this case I was pointing out that Darwin's words, that it is a matter of an "unaggressive attitude", might explain why wishy-washy is used.
But, as usual, this conversation is going off in the usual way. Here's how I see the typical discussion.
(Wise Moderate Agnostic explains his position)
Atheist Asshole: Hey, WMA, but that's exactly my philosophical position on the matter, and I'm an atheist. What's the difference?
WMA: Stop calling me an atheist.
AA: It seems to be a rhetorical difference of no consequence, since we seem to agree 100% on everything.
Peanut Gallery: Stop calling him an atheist, asshole!
WMA: I know my own mind, and I'm not an atheist. I just don't believe in God, and I don't have the unwarranted certainty that you dogmatic atheists have.
AA: But we don't claim certainty! We make the same claim that you do, that there is no credible evidence for gods!
PG: You damned assertive asshole atheists, you keep claiming you can read our minds and calling us Wise Agnostics atheists. Why do you keep calling us such a mean name?
AA: I'm not reading your mind, I'm reading what WMA wrote, and I agree with it -- this is my position, and I call myself an atheist.
PG: Quit calling us atheists, asshole, and quit telling us what we believe!
And so it goes. I give up. Really, all I've learned is that some agnostics are bigger assholes even than some of us atheists.
Also, John Pieret said: "And just what conviction should a person who thinks it is impossible to know whether there is or is not a god have the courage of?"
If one genuinely lacks the belief that god exists (regardless of one's attitude towards "knowing" as opposed to believing) and doesn't call oneself an atheist to avoid being recognized as lacking belief or to avoid being attacked for one's lack of belief, that seems evasive and a little cowardly to me. It also seems to cave in to the general anti-atheist bigotry which one sees everywhere in American society: Maybe you non-Americans don't have as much at stake in this debate.
Ultimately, I guess I have the same criticism for closet atheists (whether through disingenuous agnostic self-labeling or just not telling people) that many homosexuals have of their closeted fellows: You're not making it any easier for us collectively by hiding, you're only making it easier for yourself. I can understand the desire to do so, but I cannot wholly forgive it.
If one has more principled reasons for preferring the label agnostic to atheist and can explain those reasons, that's another thing altogether. I've got no beef with John or Chris, for example. But for those who lack belief in god and avoid the label atheist just to make their lives a little easier, as an "out" atheist I can't help but resent their choice a little.
I usually think of an agnostic as being someone who believes that the whole question of God's existence is not something that you can resolve by appeals to evidence. I believe that was Huxley's original idea in coining the term. As such, agonsticism is compatible with both God-belief and God-non-belief. For example, I have a good friend who is a devout Christian and believes unhesitantingly in God's existence, but who also rolls his eyes at ID style arguments. He describes himself as an agnostic in the sense I just described.
As a practical matter, though, I think the large majority of people who describe themselves as agnostics are in fact not theists. In terms of how they live their lives it is rather hard to distinguish people who call themselves atheists from people who call themselves agnostics.
The frustration that people like me feel towards agnostics is that by their unwillingness to state bluntly that they do not believe in God and by their frequent disdain towards people who do state that bluntly, they hurt the cause of stemming the mostly harnful influence of religion on society. It is even more frustrating when people maintain their agnosticism only by appealing to the wispy, attenuated, vacuous God of the philosophers, while having the same disdain as the atheists for the creator God in whom most religious people believe.
So yes, there is a real distinction between agnosticism and atheism and this distinction is worth hashing out at philosophy seminars and in classrooms. But it's a distinction without any important practical difference, and it masks the vastly more important common ground between nonbelievers.
PG: Quit calling us atheists, asshole, and quit telling us what we believe!
And so it goes. I give up. Really, all I've learned is that some agnostics are bigger assholes even than some of us atheists.
If you wish to label yourself as something (say, "an asshole"), most people will not be inclined to disagree. However, if you try to stick that label on someone else, for whatever reasons, you may experience some resistance.
I have no problem with making common cause with people who are atheists to prevent the harmful influence of religion on society. There is a perfectly good word for that union: "secularists". It can even include theists who value democracy over theocracy.
But if disdain towards people who state their atheism bluntly is a problem in that cause, then distain for rational theists who also want to prevent such harm (oh, say, by calling them "enablers") is also a problem.
As for the rest, not wanting to reveal whether I'm more in the peanut gallery or the ranks of the assholes, I'll simply declare everything I've ever said in the past on the subject to be ironic and leave the last word to Chris.
They hurt the cause of stemming the mostly harnful influence of religion on society. It is even more frustrating when people maintain their agnosticism only by appealing to the wispy, attenuated, vacuous God of the philosophers, while having the same disdain as the atheists for the creator God in whom most religious people believe.
What nonsense. They're with you on science and evolution, and most aspects of religion. If all the creationists in the world were suddenly replaced with such people, we'd be in great shape, don't you think? These people are not the reason for the whole creation/evolution controversy and the problems we're having with religion in the world. Far from it. They're a very minor academic side issue.
Actually, CHM, I think you're entirely missing Jason's point. No atheist here is saying that agnostics are in any way "the enemy." But agnostics who deny that they have a common cause (and common lack of belief in gods, where they share that) with atheists - and especially when they also denigrate atheists with such unearned insulting adjectives before the word "atheist" like "dogmatic" or "fundamentalist" - are clearly giving aid and comfort to the enemy thereby. And that isn't an academic side issue at all.
G-
Well said! Thanks for the defense.
John Pieret: "Out of curiosity, why is it 'weak' and 'strong' atheists instead of 'non-dogmatic' and 'dogmatic'?"
I know that some people have hammered on this, but essentially "weak atheist" and "strong atheist" are terms of art. A strong atheist believes there are grounds for making the positive claim "God does not exist," while a weak atheist does not. Bertrand Russell could be characterized as a weak atheist, and IIRC, James Randi characterizes himself as such. "Weak" and "strong" here have nothing to do with how angry or partisan one is.
"I'll simply declare everything I've ever said in the past on the subject to be ironic and leave the last word to Chris."
Is that "ironic" in the dictionary sense of the word or "ironic" in the "Alanis Morissette" sense? :)
Just what "common cause" are you talking about? I am in favor of secualrism but that has nothing to do with any common lack of belief in gods (or a lack of belief in the non-existence of gods). If by that "cause" you mean anti-religionism, that is not one I share.
And surely you got the point that, if you find adjectives such as "dogmatic" or "fundamentalist" insulting and counter-productive, then unearned insulting labels such as "wishy-washy" and "appeaser" and "enabler" are equally so.
JJ:
I know about how the terms are used by certain atheists (alt.atheism was slopping over into talk.origins long before "blog" was a twinkle in Google's eye). My experience (hey, if G can do it, so can I) is that it is invariably used by "strong atheists." I don't think that's an accident (see John's discussion of "framing"). It is still amusing to see them get all huffy about "fundamentalist atheist" and turn around and do the same thing to others.
As to irony, I always mean that which you do to a shirty.
John Pieret: "My experience (hey, if G can do it, so can I) is that it is invariably used by 'strong atheists.'"
My experience, I guess, has been a bit different. I've noticed atheists who fancy themselves as merely being "uppity" freely admitting to being weak atheists.
JJ:
I certainly wouldn't argue. It was originally a throw-away line anyway. ;-)
Jeez, my internet goes down for 12 hours and I get more traffic than I ever have in comments... since the last time I posted on agnosticism and atheism. Either it's my absence, or it's the topic. The topic, yeah...
OK, We have, as Larry noted, done this before. I only want to comment on one point:
... agnostics who deny that they have a common cause (and common lack of belief in gods, where they share that) with atheists - and especially when they also denigrate atheists with such unearned insulting adjectives before the word "atheist" like "dogmatic" or "fundamentalist" - are clearly giving aid and comfort to the enemy thereby.
See, now this is where it goes off the rails. I have no enemy amongst theists. I have no common cause with those who want to attack them, or remove them from discourse. My enemy is not theism, but ignorance, and the two are not coterminous. Ignorance I hate, and the ignorant I pity and will attempt, so far as it is in my ability, to educate, ad nauseum. But I am not in common cause with those who think they have all the rationality entirely on their side, no matter which side that might be, for I understand that no matter how righteous a position might seem to a person who holds it, they are nevertheless going to be irrational about that view to some extent, in virtue of being human.
One of my favourite anecdotes is the one about G B Shaw and the society woman. Shaw asks her, in the context of a discussion of marriage, if she will sleep with him for £1 million. After some consideration she says she would. He then asks her if she will sleep with him for £10. "What do you think I am?" she asks indignantly. "We have established that," replies Shaw, "and now we are haggling over the price."
Atheists are, no matter how slightly, irrational themselves, not because of the righteousness of their view but because they are after all only human. Now we are haggling over the degree of irrationality before we can rule people in or out of the Club. For myself, as Shaw may not have accepted, we are all excluded from that Club.
In any case, I know better than to belong to a club that would have me as a member.
Well said, BTW.
G wrote:
Jason wrote:
G wrote:
Those who do not know - but who believe? That would be what is meant by taking the existence of God to be an article of faith, would it not? And it would be the position of theists who fully accept methodological naturalism and even the necessity of testability in science, would it not? The former is undoubtedly far more common than you think, and the latter would not be an issue for me in the least.
For those who think that just because the more philosophical belief in a god is not testable or empirical that is therefore meaningless: does this mean that, given your views on the nature of truth that you believe that ethics is meaningless since ethical claims are untestable - and if so are fundamentalists right in claiming that you are without ethics?
Not arguing that atheism implies the absence of morality - but simply that the lack of testability does not necessarily imply a lack of meaningfulness - since I have little doubt that in some sense or another, any of those who have participated would admit that ethical statements are meaningful and can in some sense be regarded as true.
*
John Wilkins wrote:
There is something to be said for philosophies which regard our being "only human" as an essential insight into the human condition, something which "... encourages in its own way the view that while recognizing one's mistakes may be experienced prospectively as a form of death, the act itself brings a form of rebirth and self-transcendence, giving one the courage to revise one's beliefs when confronted with new evidence."
Of course, I prefer the the metaphor of "constant rebirth."
*
John Pieret wrote:
Now there is a point I can agree on.
Cap'n MyAARGHS is correct in observing that the difference between atheists and agnostics is more one of style than substance but it you could also call it one of focus and emphasis.
Both groups agree that evidence for the existence of any god - whatever value is assigned to the term - is notable by its absence. Both groups find the popular concept of the Christian God to be incoherent and the texts on which it is based to be riddled with inconsistencies and outright contradictions.
Agnostics, however, prefer to emphasise the problems with acquiring any knowledge about a supernatural deity in particular and, as John has done, human fallibility in general. As much as anything, this salutary reminder of human limitations is taken as prophylactic against unwarranted certainty and potential arrogance.
Modern atheists, on the other hand, seem to be much more sensitive to the threat to individual rights and freedoms posed by the more extreme forms of belief found in many faiths. They see a history of brutal oppression by those made arrogant by the certainty of their beliefs and their wilful ignorance of anything else. They see that oppression still practised in many parts of the world today and poised to engulf what remains should our guard be lowered. This is not to say that agnostics are unaware of a threat but that they differ over its magnitude and its monolithic nature. You could say that neo-atheism has become more of a political movement aimed at countering the excessive influence of the religious right - primarily in the US - while agnosticism remains more of a philosophical stance.
That said, John Pieret's point is well made that, for the purposes of resisting those with theocratic ambitions, both groups could with advantage gather under the umbrella of secularism.
Re Ian's (#34) "This is not to say that agnostics are unaware of a threat but that they differ over its magnitude and its monolithic nature [...] agnosticism remains more of a philosophical stance." Thank God! But seriously, there are atheists who support oppression and are made arrogant by their lack of philosophical reflection. Historically there were Fascists, Stalinists, Maoists and so forth, not to mention all those atheists who called themselves Catholics and Muslims but were then just playing a political language-game (rather than being sincere, or philosophical). Lots of lies, lots of confusion, so many thanks to John for his fact about Darwin.
Anyway, such atheists seem to share much of their psychology with (and to pose a threat similar to) dogmatic theists, so I for one call them 'fundamentalist atheists'. Unfortunately, some secularists are like that; but no secularists are fundamentalist theists, whence the Devil (the enemy within the good secularism) is such atheists.
Re Larry's (#9) "In my experience, there are quite a few atheists who want to avoid the 'atheist' label because it has negative connotations. Lots of people will automatically assume that you are an 'aggressive atheist' instead of a quiet, passive atheist." That's why I would call myself an 'agnostic'. In Darwin's (and Shelley's etc.) day, it may have been more usual for atheists to call themselves 'agnostic' but these materialistic days there are many theists who would, I think.
Ian:
But agnostics don't assign any significance to that absence, since they don't expect there to be any such evidence in the first place. My beliefs/disbeliefs about gods are not in any way formed by that absence of evidence, other than that it is consistent with (but not evidence for) my agnosticism.
John Pieret wrote:
There is, however, an old principle of informal logic: the burden of proof lies with him who asserts the positive. If I claim that unicorns exist, it is not up to you to prove that they do not, it is up to me to demonstrate that they do in fact exist, it is up to me to provide the evidence.
Burdens of proof are, in no small way, in my area of expertise. The kind we impose in law are not rules of logic or even rules designed to deliver a greater liklihood of truth. They are social rules concerning what the group is interested in fostering. For example, in AngloAmerican law the burden of proof of the highest sort is imposed on the state in order to convict of a crime, while in Civil Law jurisdictions, the burden (of a much lower sort) is placed on the defendant to show innocence. AngloAmerican law wants to encourage the interests of the individual against the state (at the cost of making the system of justice much harder to administer), while the Civil Law system emphasizes the interests of society as a whole to lawfulness. There's no compelling reason to believe that one is somehow more "just" than the other.
The (rather lengthy) point is that burdens of proof are, more often than not, totally unrelated to the "truthiness" of the claims involved. Furthermore, we can assume that atheists and theists will not be agreeing on the purpose of any such burden of proof or who should bear it. In any event, they are easy to manipulate:
As evidence to establish my prima facie case for the proposition that god(s) exist, I offer the statements of literally billions of people testifying that they have personally experienced god.
Now, if you want to make the "positive" claim that such evidence is not acceptable or insufficient, it is now your burden (I say) to prove that proposition, and we are off to the races on an argument in epistemology that you cannot successfully bear the burden of proof on (people have been trying for a long, long time).
A rule of thumb with at least as much validity to this case, if not more so, is: 'the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.'
Timothy did say "informal" logic. In formal logic there is no burden of proof because there is no claim that has any better standing than any other, except in erotetic logics (the logic of Q&A).
Much of this depends on what one thinks is privileged - that is, what claim needs to be dealt with. If I might reignite the debate, I think that agnostics deal first with the claim that there is knowledge (including likelihood assessments) of any kind in the matter they are agnostic about, while atheists and theists alike deal first with the claim that there is a God, assuming that some conclusion is possible at all (that is, that there is knowledge of some kind to be had).
All the stuff about "positive" and "negative" claims is a matter of politics - who has the loudest voice. In common law, the defendant has the loudest voice, and the plaintiff or prosecutor needs to establish the case (although in corrupt jurisdictions this is inverted, again because of politics). None of it is dictated by the logic of the debate.
It doesn't help to confuse legal and political exigencies with logical or philosophical issues. I know that politically, religion has the upper hand in many countries, but that is irrelevant to the logic.
John Pieret wrote:
Is there a difference between "consistent with" and "evidence for"?
As I see it, there are data and there is evidence. Data are collections of raw observations. Data become evidence when they are fitted into an explanatory framework and can hence be interpreted as supporting it.
In the case of religion, billions of people attesting to personal experience of a god are data. If the proffered explanation is one of a theistic god who is continuously intervening in the Universe then those experiences could be taken as evidence for it. But they cannot be taken as evidence for the existence of the non-interventionist god of deism.
John Pieret,
As evidence to establish my prima facie case for the proposition that god(s) exist, I offer the statements of literally billions of people testifying that they have personally experienced god.
Where are these statements, then? Show them to us. You can't, of course. Because there is no record of "billions" of such statements. You're just assuming that "literally billions" of people have claimed to have experienced God. Assumptions are not evidence.
So we needn't even bother with the question of whether such statements would constitute evidence for the proposition that God exists, since you haven't even shown that the statements themselves exist.
Try again.
Since I had specifically stated "informal logic," switching to the context of law (or politics) would be an instance of the "fallacy of diversion."
Likewise, when you state:
... this would be an instance of the "appeal to majority." It might work in a democracy, but it is worthless in the realm of informal logic.
When I assert that there is the normative principle of informal logic that the burden of proof lies with him who asserts the positive, I suppose you could ask me to justify my assertion, but if so, what principle will you appeal to? Do you assert that this is simply an arbitrary social convention, or principle which is advocated simply in order to privilege a group which is in power? Or am I violating the vicious circle principle identified by Bertrand Russell in Principia Mathematica?
Just wondering...
In any case, while there may be approaches to justifying theism or agnosticism, trying to dispense with the need for justifying positive assertions altogether is probably something we can safely rule out.
I probably shouldn't post during breaks from work while dealing with a case that has multiple different burdens of proof running in various directions among multiple parties, none of which is in anyway intended to improve the search for truth. I thought it was clear that I was inviting Timothy to justify that burden of proof he is claiming. It wouldn't be the first time I was wrong about my clarity and won't be the last.
And Timothy, I may be a blowhard but, since I went on to answer your demand to address that burden, I was not engaged in any fallacy of diversion. And may I also point out that you can't have it both ways. If you are entitled to use "informal logic" to claim a burden that, as John has pointed out, does not exist in formal logic, then you can't demand, at your convenience, that I adhere to the strict rules of formal logic.
And yes, I am saying this particular "burden of proof" is quite possibly a social convention in the form of a rhetorical device. The real question is if you justify it in other terms.
As to the burden of proof, I have presented evidence (and no, it is not an appeal to the majority). The reports of individuals, even of their internal states, are evidence used in medicine to diagnose and in the law to determine issues on which someone's life hangs, just for two examples. If there is some reason that such report aren't evidence, please explain.
I thus contend that I met the burden you established. Indeed, the presentation of a single piece of evidence, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, is sufficient to demonstrate that something exists. In other words, once evidence going to the point is presented, the burden should then shift to the person opposing that proposition ... in any non-rhetorical system and unless you have some unstated, burden of proof you will now trot out to suit the occasion ... say, 'extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence'? [And Jason: the report of the personal experience of god is common. even the norm, in Christianity and, I believe, Islam. See, for example, any of the recent interviews with Francis Collins about his book. Since there are roughly 3.4 billion people who presently belong to those two religions alone -- hardly the only religions to have adherents reporting such experiences -- and extending back over many centuries, at least, I think the claim is hardly unreasonable. Besides, if you want a specific type of evidence, that would just be ratcheting up the burden again.]
Well, I'll certainly agree that the rhetoric in such arguments is not likely to improve any time soon.
Ian:
I think so. Actually, you are close to the distinction I was making where you say that evidence for an interventionist god wouldn't be evidence for a non-interventionist god of deism (though I might disagree with the particular example). Let's say we had evidence for a divine creation of the universe. Such evidence would be consistent with either a Deist god or an interventionist god but, itself, would not go to which of the two might be true. Supporters of either god could claim such evidence is consistent with their beliefs. On the other hand, evidence of a miracle last week would be some evidence for the interventionist god and against the Deist god.
John Pieret wrote:
It is a fallacy of diversion if you attempt to conflate the notion of "burden of proof" as it exists within law with "burden of proof" as it exists within informal logic. However, if you will notice, even within the domain of law, when you deal with the difference between criminal and civil standards, there is a principle of the burden of proof, but it is the degree of justification which must be met by the different, specialized standards as they exist within those domains which is itself different. Formally the principle remains the same. And formally, the principle is still that the burden of proof lies with the individual who asserts the positive.
The idea here is simple.
There may be things which we can claim to know with absolute certainty. The principles of formal logic, for example. Definitions - perhaps. But the vast majority of what we may claim to know (as in science) consists of knowledge which is justified - but only to a certain degree. In principle, one might claim, for example, that they universe came into existence six thousand years ago or six seconds ago - and that all evidence to the contrary (including memories and bellybuttons) was created at the same time - giving merely the appearance of age. Such an "Omphalosian theory" can be consistently maintained in the sense of forming an internally coherent system. It would in no way violate the norms of formal logic. But it would be indefensible as a matter of informal logic. Viewed from the standards required by the scientific method, for example, it would be entirely untestable. Likewise, there would be no way to decide between the claim that the universe is six thousand years or six seconds in age - if that sort of argument were acceptable.
All knowledge justified by means of induction is justified - but only to a certain degree. Likewise, given the absence of evidence to the contrary, one may trust one's senses - but then there always exists the possibility that there is some perceptual illusion which one may be unaware of. Of course if someone asks you, "Who are you going to believe? Me or your lying eyes?!," then they had better be prepared to offer some evidence to the effect that you are suffering from some form of perceptual illusion. This is in fact just the sort of problem that the Omphalosian theory faces - from the perspective of informal logic: the individual putting forward the claim that "all appearances of age are deceiving" is offering no positive evidence for his claim - and the evidence which we have to the contrary strongly supports the conclusion that the world is ancient. Moreover, by any reasonable standard of justification, we have the right to conclude not only that the world is ancient, but that we know it to be ancient.
In any case, formal logic, it would seem, achieves the absolute certainty of incorrigible knowledge, but at a very high price: the knowledge which it achieves is without empirical content. It is afterall "formal" logic, is it not? So in a certain sense, any view which may be called a view in any legitimate sense of the term will adhere to the requirements of formal logic - if the view is internally coherent. In this sense, formal logic actually has very little to say about our world.
If we are to employ a method to discover and speak about our world, then we must choose a larger set of tools. These may be informal logic, induction, the scientific method - and perhaps others. What methods are permitted and how they are related would be a matter for epistemology. However, employing a method which permits to actually deal with the specfics of our world comes at a price: our conclusions are corrigible - justified, but only to a certain degree, a point along a continuem, where the point might be arbitrarily close to the incorrigibility of the claims of formal logic, but never actually reaches this.
John Pieret wrote:
I believe you missed his point: that insofar as formal logic is without content, it would involve a far weaker criteria - that of mere internal consistency - unless it derives its content from some other method. Likewise, he was distinguishing between formal logic and informal logic in order to stress the fact that what I was dealing in is informal logic, not politics. So at no point did I request that you adhere to something other than that which I was defending: informal logic - which I take quite seriously - unless you are counting an implicit appeal to the principle of self-referential coherence, but then that isn't exactly formal logic, either.
John Pieret wrote:
I disagree - since one can apply it internally when considering a skeptical argument as opposed to an argument which has the support of some evidence. It does not require a social context - and it is one of the principles of informal logic which we ought to adhere to if our conclusions are to bear any relationship to reality. However, you might ask me to justify my claim, either through some form of argumentation or by the appeal to evidence, but in this case you would be appealing to the principle itself. In pointing to the fact that it can be applied within a personal context, I have succeeded - but in any case, the request for such "proof" (understood in the sense of informal logic - rather than as a "deductive" proof) or for any "proof" for that matter is an appeal to the principle itself, and thus the demand for such a proof of necessity presupposes the very thing which it requests to have proven. As such, the request would be self-referentially incoherent, or so it would seem.
John Pieret wrote:
This depends upon what you mean by "experience."
If you mean that some individuals have had what can be scientifically understood (given our current knowledge) as some form of hallucination, then yes, I suppose that would be evidence of a sort - although evidence for what may be a different matter. If on the otherhand, by "experience" and "internal states" you are refering to their mere belief that a god or gods exist, then this is an "appeal to majority." As I have little reason to think that there is any widespread evidence of the former kind, I could only assume that you meant the latter - given the generous nature of your claims. Then of course there are those who believe in a god or gods fervently. Perhaps it was this somewhat narrower category of people that you were refering to? But if so, regarding the "fervent" nature of their belief as evidence is then an appeal to emotion.
Don't get me wrong: I may be sympathetic to those who believe in a personal god. However, I am unwilling to make of informal logic a sacrificial offering.
Beliefs are complicated things, determining our choices and changing as we reflect upon our choices. But let B = 1 if we are theists, 0 if we are agnostics and -1 if we are atheists. For some hypothetical choices, each of us would veer one way or the other, none of us would have B = 0.
One simple choice that is not available to us is the following. For some natural number N, aliens offer either ($) to change the minds of N powerful people who are very confident in their B-values (changing the signs of those B-values via psychological techniques), or else (T) to show you which of B = 1 or B = -1 is really the case, giving you a justified confidence in the true B-value (via the vast knowledge of the aliens). The smaller the value of N for which one would change from choosing $ to choosing T, the less confident (the more agnostic) one is. Those who would choose T for any value of N (in this world of relatively few powerful people) are very agnostic.
Those few scientists for whom B = 1 really ought to choose T for quite a small N, if they really are scientific. (E.g. Darwin began as a good scientist and became a great scientist, not unreasonably.) But why is it not similarly obvious that those with B = -1 ought to too?
Incidentally, re Larry's (#9) "the word 'atheist' simply means than one has failed to be convinced about the existence of God," maybe that presumes that the natural default position is to posit the absence of God.
But if, for example, we explain religion away on the grounds that we naturally posit purposes behind appearances (see faces in random patterns, suspect predators when bushes rustle, etc.), since that had genetic survival value, then the natural default position would be to posit some sort of God.
Re PZ's beautifully Platonistic (#17) "AA: But we don't claim certainty! We make the same claim that you do, that there is no credible evidence for gods!" may I rain on the parade by noting that the Peanut Gallery might throw in a note to say that:
(i) to be agnostic does not mean believing that there is no credible evidence, only that the credible evidence is inconclusive, and:
(ii) how we interpret basic data as evidence is sensitive to our existing beliefs, in complex ways whose importance seems not to have occured to such as G (#16) and Jason (#19) and even John P (#36) (?)
Ironically, re G's (#18) "Maybe you non-Americans don't have as much at stake in this debate," Iraq has at least shown most of us that we do (evidence that it is indeed an ill wind that blows nobody no good). But anyway, how wishy-washy: why not just assert that we do not? Ah, then you would acquire a burden to justify your claim...
I haven't. (And according to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy I can't, since "legal argument" is included in its definition of the term.) I've challenge you twice to justify this so-called "informal logic" about "positive claims" (that John calls "political," BYW) and have gotten back ever increasing amounts of word salad. Third time's the charm?
That's just flat-out wrong, unless you'd care to give a less "informal" definition of "the positive." As I've already pointed out, the AngloAmerican system assigns the burden of proof in a criminal trial to the state; in the civil system, it is assigned to the defendant. If you say that is because they have different systems and, therefore, different "positives," you are just begging the question of how your system of putting the burden on any particular thing you chose to call "the positive" was itself "chosen" and by who.
And that is the question I have been asking you. Who gets to choose, on what basis, and what rules, if any, are enforced? For example, you claim that someone asserting an undefined "positive" has an undefined "burden" of an coming forward with an undefined level of "proof." If there is any sort of logic to this "informal logic" of yours, the person you challenge, at a minimum has the right to know how you define those terms and the ability to dispute the correctness of each. What ... are ... they?
That's cute. You asset there is such a thing as a "burden of proof on the positive" based on no evidence at all except an extremely fuzzy appeal to an undefined "informal logic" and if anyone challenges you to defend that proposition, you say they are appealing to the same "informal logic" and you've won? Running in such tight circles can result in your disappearing up your own ass ... informally speaking, of course.
I'm sorry, I can't be bothered anymore. If you want to talk seriously about it, start by defining "positive" with some rigor, set out the burden you want to impose and the level of "proof" you are talking about. Otherwise, it's just cheap rhetoric ... something to baffle opponents without having to come up with any substance of your own.
Oh, I almost forgot ...
"Can be" understood? That, of course, is your "positive" claim (because I say so, that's why!) and since you didn't meet your burden (which I won't define for you) by the (unspecified) type of proof I demand, you must have just lost the argument ... I guess.
As I see it, the principle of burden of proof resting with the claimant follows from the fact that a claim is not - usually - stated to a vacuum but to an audience, even if that audience is only the claimants themselves. The presumed purpose of stating the claim, therefore, is not merely to assert it but to persuade the audience of its truth and if claimants want to persuade their audience of of their claim's truth then they have to provide the evidence.
In a criminal court case the burden of proof is presumed to rest with the prosecution since they are claiming that the defendant is guilty of the charge with which he or she has been indicted. The standard of proof is that it must be sufficient to persuade a jury of the truth of the claim and, hence, the guilt of the accused.
In science, the ideal is that the truth of a claim is not decided by a single test of the evidence but by the steady accumulation of evidence from observation and test results over time, with the claim being modified where necessary to accommodate new evidence. The standard of proof here is that it must be sufficient to persuade a majority of the community of specialists in the claim's field since they are, in the first instance, the primary audience for the claim.
AA: "It is different for B = -1, because that is a negative belief." (Or so a Devil whispers in my ear.)
That whole positive/negative thing is, however, a red herring, a straw man. Any assertion is an assertion, which needs justifying. We might prove the existence of something by proving that its non-existence implies an absurdity, for example, without us knowing anything else about it. And when we look for explanations of empirical observations, it matters a great deal whether or not some kind of thing is reasonably available to us. If it is, we might find out more about its properties in a relatively scientific way. If it is not, we must find our explanations elsewhere, however weird they end up being; and thence we come to the real debate, between fundamentalists and atheists in American Biology, as I see it.
("We've come nowhere, because that was nonsense," says the Devil, not realising that justification-by-not-understanding comes easier to the God-botherers, and more plausibly because modern science, if it does challenge some theisms, poses a more obvious challenge to the common sense that founded the original and best challenge to the God-botherers.)
Science is a matter of having good reasons, rather than a popularity contest. Insofar as popularity is important within science, it is an elitist popularity (and all the better for it). But outside science democracy rules, whence its ethical constraints do come from a popularity contest, because who could be the experts in ethical matters? Moral philosophers and philosophical theologians, the theist might suggest, but lawyers and sociologists the atheist. So the god of the philosophers is not unimportant to this debate: in a popularity contest, fundamentalists get a big, bad vote. And it is worse than that, because if popularity contests decide life-and-death issues, then why not ontological ones too? So, insofar as atheists do make unjustified assumptions about what is possible, rather than reasonable requests for justifications from the fundamentalists (which philosophically minded theists also want), their opponents find it that much easier to carry the general public with them on the teaching of Darwinianisms...
The problem with such an explanation of persuasive argument is that it relieves the proponent of any responsibility to deal with contrary evidence. S/he needs only "meet the burden" (as determined by the level of knowledge of that particular audience) and that's the end of the proponent's burden/responsibility. That's among the reasons I think the whole business of "burdens" is merely rhetoric. The responsibility of all parties to any real debate should be to deal with all the evidence that exists on the subject and the business of who goes first in any situation (which is what "burdens" really determine) is irrelevant to honest discourse ...
Which is why we have so many of them in the law, since law isn't about honest discourse, of course. ;-)
I mentioned erotetic logics before. This is crucial here. An erotetic logic is a logic of argumentation, or more exactly, the logic of answers to questions. A simple example is the old saw about asking for yes or no answers and then asking when you stopped beating your spouse. The logic here offers alternatives that may not apply.
In the ordinary context of, say, American society, the default view is that God or gods exist, and one has to justify not believing in them, for social reasons. The logic then requires an answer to the question "Why aren't you a theist?". But this is not the only position to take, and as non-theist views rise in number, in those contexts, both social and conceptual, the question can become "Why are you a theist?", taking, as many have said, the view that atheism is a default position.
An agnostic view, as I have often said here and elsewhere, has a different focus: "why would you need to have a position on theism?" When cast that way, the onus lies on the theist and the atheist to give a justification, and while I think that the atheist has a much better case, this question is one of the possibility of knowledge, not a rational assessment of the probabilities or likelihoods.
So I, as an agnostic, place the burden on both their houses (at least, I think it's a burden). Until one side can convince me that the issue is even knowable, I place the entire debate, as I think Darwin did (but not because he did), out there with questions about the existence of computers inside the event horizon of black holes. There may be a fact of the matter, but I can't see how we can decide.
Some theisms are ruled out (including, I increasingly believe, the theism of the present Pope and his cohort) by science. Others aren't. On them, I do not grant the possibility of knowledge, so until that question can be resolved in the positive, I will never be moved.
Holy crap! I lose track of a thread for a while and it goes on and on based on a misconception of what I wrote that I cannot believe anyone misconceived. My discussion of "the enemy" was in direct response to CHM's post (a reply to my previous post) in which he said, "What nonsense. They're ["they" indicating agnostics of the type I've been criticizing] with you on science and evolution, and most aspects of religion. If all the creationists in the world were suddenly replaced with such people, we'd be in great shape, don't you think? These people are not the reason for the whole creation/evolution controversy and the problems we're having with religion in the world. Far from it. They're a very minor academic side issue."
So, given that I was responding exactly and directly to that post, "the enemy" would be... that's right, creationists (and perhaps, by implication, theocrats in general). How could anyone misread that if they were following the thread from one post to the next?
And I'm sorry, John, but your very principled position that you have no enemy but ignorance seems to miss an important truth: I don't go looking for fights, but sometimes, your enemies pick you rather than the other way around. The forces of ignorance - the Creationists, the Dominionists, and various other Right Wing Religious forces that are doing their damnedest to take over my country - have attacked, denigrated, and attempted to silence any and everyone who take science, reason, and intellectual honesty in general seriously. I am their enemy whether I think of them as my enemy or not - and I think it would be rather foolish of me to ignore that. Although I realize Australia has its own forces of ignorance, I don't think they've achieved quite the same level of total political dominance of your conservative party that they have of ours.
I wrote:
John Pieret responded:
You provided a link to an explanation of "informal logic," but judging from what I saw, it did not directly mention "burden of proof." However, in any case, as I have stated, the principle that the burden of proof lies with the individual who asserts the positive" is a well recognized principle of "informal logic," or alternatively, "rational discourse." However, it would be reasonable to mention the "burden of proof" as it applies to law within an article devoted to philosophy insofar as the "burden of proof" in law is derived from the "burden of proof" of informal logic. But the burden of proof of informal logic is more basic.
I wrote:
John Pieret responded:
On the contrary, even in common law, the initial burden of proof lies with the individual who asserts that a crime has been commited. The difference between common or civil law and criminal law lies in the standard of proof. Civil law operates in by reference to the standard of proof known as "the preponderance of the evidence" such that it would be reasonable to conclude that the crime has been commited. Criminal law typically operates by reference to the standard known as "beyond a reasonable doubt." In contrast, "guilty unless proven innocent" is a principle belonging to a dictatorship or totalitarian regime.
I wrote:
John Pieret responded:
Unless stated otherwise, anyone may properly presume that the standards of rational discourse are in effect. However, if you wish to appeal to the scientific method, for example, that is your perrogative. Alternatively, you may have some other method in mind. If so, I may be willing to consider it - assuming you can define it.
As for "who decides" that informal logic is in effect, you do when you go through the motions of presenting a meaningful argument or choose to engage in rational discourse. With regard to "who decides" what informal logic consists of, I would say that it arose systemically - it evolved, much like common law itself. However, with respect to any principle of informal logic, it should be possible to demonstrate that it is proper to accept such a principle to anyone's reasonable satisfaction. For example, informally, pointing to someone's assertion that "unicorns exist" and someone else's denial that they do is generally more than sufficient to illustrate the "burden of proof" lies with the individual who asserts the positive.
However, since you still refuse to recognize it as a principle of rational discourse we can take this one step further: it is implicit in the form of argumentation itself. When one asserts a particular proposition, if this proposition is subject to dispute, one is expected to attempt to justify it by providing an argument for the proposition by treating the proposition as the conclusion to an argument. However, as a matter of civil discourse, one may choose to temporarily set aside the proposition or even discourse itself, if it seems appropriate. Nevertheless, the principle is still a principle of rational discourse, it is simply the discourse regarding the proposition which is no longer in effect.
I wrote:
John Pieret responded:
The following is the introduction I used for self-referential argumentation a while back. In the introduction, I deal with what I can "denial skepticism." "Denial skepticism" is probably the least interesting problem, and so in the section which followed, I gave "doubting skepticism" which I will not be posting, but which I can provide upon request. However, even given the two examples, one might still claim that such argumentation is ultimately circular - as Bertrand Russell would claim is inherent in all self-referential reasoning. If so we could examine this claim in further detail - although I suspect that what I am currently providing will already be more than what most will find of interest...
John Wilkins wrote:
I am not familiar with erotetic logic per se, but I don't really see a need for it even within this context as of yet - although I would be interested in learning more about it. However, the reason why I don't find it necessary at this point is simply this: rather than asking "Why you would need to have a position?", I would ask "Why is it necessary for everyone to agree to the same position?"
Individuals may have their own positions, and as a matter of civil discourse, they needn't necessarily be debated or discussed. For me, the issue is simply with respect to the defense of informal logic and the abstract principle of the burden of proof, and secondarily how one would approach things within the context of a philosophic discussion.
Normally I will not ask people to rationally defend their articles of faith - it would be an impolite invasion of issues which are primarily personal in nature. However, if someone wishes to defend theism, atheism, or agnosticism within the context of philosophy, then I expect them to employ at the very least informal logic. And even in everyday discourse, I expect people to adhere to informal logic. If it appears to me that someone is making an attack upon it, I will tend to take this rather personally.
In any case, my apologies if I was overly enthusiastic. I am simply not used to someone dismissing as irrelevant the abstract principle of the burden of proof.
I had intended not to post any more in this thread unless others posted, but at the risk of appearing an ass or like someone who is out looking for something to agree with, I believe this deserves some emphasis...
John Pieret wrote:
While I disagree with what you would have us draw from this, it is worth noting that this brings us closer to what is traditionally thought of as the scientific method, namely, falsifiability. As anyone familiar with the history of thought regarding the scientific method should be aware, in the view of Karl Popper, the scientific method isn't concerned with justification, but with falsfiability (1930s and 1940s). In his view, no scientific theory could ever be considered a form of knowledge, but likewise, no theory which is not falsifiable could be considered scientific.
There are of course problems with this sort of approach, namely, that scientific theories are rarely testable in isolation from all other scientific theories, and as such, to test a theory, one must presuppose the truth of more well-established theories if the theory which one is testing is to be falsifiable. This is, in essence, Duhem's thesis (from the early 1890s) - later popularised (with a great deal of excess baggage, in my view) by Quine in his "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" in the 1950s which he later expanded upon with "The Web of Belief."
As such, a philosophy of science which does not involve justification no longer seems tenable. Nevertheless, testability is clearly an important element, roughly on par with justification, and traditionally, epistemology - particularly hierarchical theories of knowledge (i.e., various forms of "foundationalism") - neglected testability as they focused on "the problem of justification."
I wouldn't want this point lost, and for this reason I thought it worth underscoring.
John (#53) on theism: "this question is one of the possibility of knowledge, not a rational assessment of the probabilities or likelihoods [...] I do not grant the possibility of knowledge, so until that question can be resolved in the positive, I will never be moved."
If there is a God (any God) then it is by definition possible for Him to bestow knowledge of Himself upon His creatures. We would not have to hunt Him down and try to deduce, from how He looked to us, that He was divine (not just weird-looking), as we would (more or less) have to do for any sort of thing were there no God.
On a related point of logic, it is simply not true that theists have a problem with a benevolent, omniscient and omnipotent God. (Perhaps posing the problem, to theology students, is pedagologically useful though, much as posing the paradox of the Liar is, in philosophy.)
Analogically, are physicalists illogical not to throw away their basic belief, in the existence of a physical world, just because the theory (or model etc.) of quantum mechanics and that of general relativity are incompatible? Of course not. They can quite logically continue to believe in a unified physical world that is both quantum-mechanical and general-relativistic.
If anything, it's easier for the theist because the prefix 'omni' in this context indicates something no less infinite than the set-theorists' proper classes. And furthermore, goodness, knowledge and power are intrinsically more complicated concepts, than matter and space. Whence the theist can rationally believe in a God that is benevolent, omniscient and omnipotent (e.g. we may think of God as omniscient about this Universe, as it is His creation, but not necessarily about everything else, so far as we know).
Let me be blunt. What you said about the law is spectacularly wrong. The fact that you would confidently spout nonsense about the law to a lawyer is pretty good evidence that I can safely ignore the rest of what you say. Still ...
That's a start. So when are you going to bear the burden and present evidence on the correctness of that statement? (We'll worry about the standard of proof later ... baby steps!)
I specifically referred to the widely discussed report of Francis Collins of his experience of the presence of God as one example out of many such reports that I have knowledge of. I'm sorry, but it's not my problem if you are as unfamiliar with the religions and religious thought you presume to criticize as you are of the law.
You seem to want to dismiss such evidence of the internal states of people (good enough for medical diagnosis and a court of law) as "mere belief." Since that amounts to a claim that, as a principle of evidence, we should not accept such reports at face value, I will await with bated breath your attempt to bear the burden on that issue.
What I have lost interest in is obscurant babble. (The notion of your accusing anyone else of the fallacy of diversion is excruciating irony. How you dragged Popper into this, other than by utter free-association, I cannot tell.)
As to Russell (and without bothering to look it up since it has nothing to do with this), it appears he is out to debunk the kind of argument, for example, that some religionists make that 'you can't say that there are no absolute truths because that, itself, is an absolute statement about truth.' Those types of arguments, as far as I have seen involve subtle shifts in the terms under consideration.
Be that as it may, and resisting that attempt to divert, I'm not making any such claim. You have asserted the existence of a "rule" of "informal logic" that someone who makes a "positive" claim (at last defined as: "that something exists, whether it be an entity, law, principle or crime") bears the "burden of proof" on the issue. I have not said that it is an incoherent statement (in the formal sense ... you put it unclearly enough to be confusing). I have merely pointed out that, by the terms of your own claim you bear the burden of demonstrating the truth of that claim. Which is something you have notably failed to do as yet. There is no allegation of self-contradiction. I am merely holding you to your own word.
Gee, I wonder why that could be? Maybe you could provide us with a link to a discussion of informal logic that includes a discussion of the "well recognized principle" of burdens of proof. Just so the skeptical amongst us don't think that it's merely rhetoric or some self-defense mechanism to relieve people of the need to consider arguments they'd prefer not to.
That can happen when a person's unexamined defense mechanisms are questioned for the first time.
In response to John Pieret...
As I have pointed out, it is not my purpose to disprove the existence of God. A good argument would be more than enough to put God in the running - assuming two individuals wish to debate the existence of God. In point of fact, I suggested something along these lines earlier which I believe gets closer to the more sophisticated conceptions of God.
The argument involves the origins of normativity (or "oughtness" - as in "one ought to choose the simplest theory which fits all the evidence") in both epistemology and ethics and the fact that such normativity is something which cannot itself be tested or justified by means of evidence since any conclusion one might make based upon the evidence would have to presuppose such normativity. However, I left this approach entirely undeveloped since, as a member of the "quasi-" branch of Spinozism it is a viewpoint I ultimately do not agree with. Nevertheless, I believe this sort of argument is quite reasonable, that it gets to the heart of the motivation which many have for believing in God, that it may focus one's soul upon the persuit of truth and thereby achieve great nobility. Moreover, an important part of this nobility lies in the struggle with one's faith within the context of a rationality which it may serve to support. While I may disagree with it, this sort of approach is something that I have the greatest respect for.
Alternatively, a reductio ad absurdum can be used against some conceptions of God. However, in either case, whether an individual is a theist or atheist, they must recognize the fact that when someone claims that something in particular exists, whether it be a tree or a unicorn, the burden of proof initially lies with the individual who claims that something exists. Moreover, if the religious do not recognize this much, then the essential connection between such a sophisticated faith and the persuit of truth is lost, and likewise so is the most essential cause underlying the noble, personal struggle with one's faith. Nevertheless, this has not been my primary concern.
In no small part, my focus has been with the burden of proof as it applies within informal logic. In part this has been a matter of fairness to the position of the atheists who are convinced of the truth of their belief that no god exists and who believe that there is no actual evidence for the existence of a god. However, with regard to atheists, there is more which they must do than simply argue that the religious cannot make an argument for the existence of a god. So long as they regard disproving religion as their central goal, their view is strictly negative. They are offering no view of their own and no alternative explanation of the origin of the normativity which is the greatest strength of the more sophisticated approach to religion and no defined alternative to its normative guidance.
However, in the context of this "debate" which we have been draw into, I have regarded this and the nature of both religion and atheism as entirely secondary. Instead my focus has been on the principlesby reference to which we may acheive justified belief - beginning with informal logic. More broadly, I have been concerned with issues in epistemology (also known as knowledge theory) and then the philosophy of science, and given the general subject of this blog - the philosophy of biology with a focus on evolutionary biology - this seems appropriate.
*
Given the preceding, it should come as no suprise to anyone that I am not particularly concerned with law. Nevertheless, in denying the principle that the burden of proof(i.e., that it lies with the individual who asserts the positive) you have leaned very heavily upon your legal expertise.
You write:
In point of fact, you are leaning heavily upon the fact that you are a lawyer in order to deny the very fundamentals of your profession. I can only assume that you are doing so as a result of the adversarial approach required within the context of the courtroom.
*
What I have said regarding the law has been at a very basic level. I have pointed out that the initial burden of proof lies with the prosecution. I have distinguished between the principle of the burden of proof and the "standard of evidence" or justification. I have pointed out that in criminal cases the standard of evidence is "beyond a reasonable doubt" but in civil cases it is "a preponderance of the evidence." (See post #55.)
All of this can be found here:
http://dictionary.law.com/default2.asp?searched=preponderance+of+the+ev…
The civil standard is a much weaker standard of "proof" or justification, which means that it is far easier for the initial burden of proof to shift from the prosecution to the defense. However, this does not change the fact that the initial burden of proof remains with the prosecution even in civil cases. Moreover, when you assert that the burden of proof lies with the defense in such cases, the principle which you are enunciating is a principle belonging to the legal system of a totalitarian regime.
Now I should think that after several years of war in Iraq, everyone would see the necessity of placing the burden of proof upon the individual who asserts the positive. As reasons for going war, we were told that there was a connection between th Al Quaida and the Iraqi regime. There was none. We were told that there was strong evidence that Sadam Hussein was persuing weapons of mass destruction. There was no such evidence. Arguing that the burden of proof is an arbitrary social convention is irrational and ultimately destructive and it has no basis whatsoever in the legal system of a free society.
*
There is a great deal of value to be found in the adversarial approach.
For one thing, the views of the prosecution and the defense are both tested in a process of discovery, making possible for the courtroom to act as a crucible to bring out the truth. However, there are also dangers associated with the adversarial approach. Each side can become so concerned with the goal of winning "the argument" that they lose all concern for truth. In contrast to this adversarial approach and the disinterest which it shows in the truth, I will often advocate what I refer to as dialogue.
In dialogue one never loses sight of one's primary objective: the persuit of the truth. In dialogue one does not regard others primarily as adversaries, but as allies in the joint endeavor of discovering the truth. There will be differences and there will be disagreements - but one should never permit this to cloud one's recognition of the essential nature of dialogue. Even when one disagrees with another, one still seeks to learn from their insights even if, given their frame of mind, they are unable to reciprocate. Being willing to learn from another encourages cooperation. But more importantly it brings one closer to the discovery of the truth.
The principle behind this is fairly simple. If the individual has only three insights, then he can make only three connections involving only two insights. However, if there are three individuals with three insights each, an individual who is able to acknowledge all nine insights is capable of making thirty-six connections. But viewing others fundamentally as adversaries, one is inclined to deny their insights rather than recognize those insights and learn from the "other" in the "us vs. them" approach of debate.
Moreover, from this perspective I believe it is possible to see why I believe that it is unwise to debate religion - and thus for atheists to insist upon the renunciation of a belief in a god before they will have any "rational" discussion with the religious. In so doing, they are setting up an "us vs. them" approach for both which invites complementary schismogenesis and greatly reduces the likelihood that anyone will learn from anyone, and as as a consequence makes rational cooperation nearly impossible even when it is in everyone's interests.
*
John Pieret wrote:
I presume that you are speaking of his aesthetic experience involving a waterfall, or alternatively, his patient who asked him whether he believed in God. On a personal level, I can understand the importance that the aesthetic experience involving a waterfall might have. Likewise, I can understand the courage which religion *may* instill in someone when facing the prospect of death. These things are not to be made light of, and they may be enough for someone at least temporarily. However, for the religious it is my hope that their struggle with their faith does not end there - otherwise it is stillborn. Moreover, this is not the sort of thing which can carry much weight with those who are not already inclined to have faith. In this sense both are subjective, and from the perspective of informal logic, an appeal to emotion.
However, when one is first inclined towards a particular belief, assuming it is of a sufficiently abstract nature, it would be irrational for someone else to demand a rigorous argument for that belief on the spot. Likewise one shouldn't demand such an argument of oneself, but give oneself the opportunity to explore the belief and what possible basis it might have and how it stands in relation to reality.
*
John Pieret wrote:
Actually I brought up Russell because he argued against self-reference, and as a consequence against the very sort of argument I used earlier when arguing for the the principle of the "burden of proof" in a way that ultimately reduces to the recognition of the necessity of justification for one's claims in the context of rational discourse. I personally find self-referential argumentation to be a fairly powerful tool in the realm of technical philosophy, but in that realm it can become necessary to defend the legitimacy of self-reference before one can defend self-referential argumentation. However, it is fairly incidental, and I believe that in the context of this discussion post #56 is more than sufficient for defending self-referential argumentation itself.
I was speaking about the difference between AngloAmerican law and the Code civil, sometimes called the Napoleonic Code. If you weren't so busy blovating, you might have tumbled to that fact.
Sorry, that's it. The rest of the babble went unread and will remain so. Have a nice life sheltered in your mental defenses.
I see what you mean:
Back on the stand
There are two defendants at the retrial in Peru this week: Lori Berenson and an antiquated legal system that dates back to Napoleon.
March 22, 2001
http://archive.salon.com/news/feature/2001/03/22/berenson/index.html
From what I understand, "innocent until proven guilty" is actually written into their legal system, the practice of their laws still harkens back to the Napoleonic code of 1804.
Remind me not to visit Peru.
From what I understand, Bulgaria maintains a similar practice - although they are facing pressures to change this. In any case, I said that even informal logic is the result of a systemic process - not laid down from above. The same is clearly the case with legal systems - and I wouldn't have suggested otherwise.
Take care.
John Pieret wrote:
I agree, by and large. I didn't mean to imply that the claimant's burden ended with the initial presentation. Once the claim has been stated and the evidence set out, the debate moves on to examination of the evidence and arguments, introduction of further evidence, counter-claims and so on.
You mean trials are not like those we see in Law % Order or Shark? I'm shocked.
If all of you esoteric babblers were to take the time to actually research the abundant evidence of the existance of God, there would be no need for each of you to expend countless hours engaging in semantical pissing contests. The existing evidence of the liklihood of His existance goes far beyond "nebulous notions of experience."(post61)The previous 100 years is rife with countless apparent miracles that have defied scientific explanation. Thousands of individuals who have experienced powerful miracles in their lives would surely take issue with Johns use of the word "nebulous" in this context. When fully explored, these occurrences obviate the use of the term,"obscurant babble"
As to the question of "God bestowing knowledge of Himself"(post#60) in a fashion more overt and profound than that which I've illustrated, well, wouldn't that be strikingly akin to having each of us mimick the experience of the apostle Thomas? How could He objectively decide who amongst us to welcome into His everlasting realm? On the contrary, I think He must much prefer that we do "hunt Him down" through a process of self exploration, minus prideful closed-mindedness. I think it goes well beyond concepts that are merely "pedagologically useful"
Again, to borrow Johns phrase, specifics are indeed difficult when we're talking about thousands of apparent encounters with the miraculous, but, I think the question becomes: which specific would be the most convincing to cite?
Bob Evans wote:
Such as...?
With respect, Ian, when I came upon this site, quite inadvertently,I saw the discussion from the standpoint of an academic; albeit one who happens to be of the Christian persuasion. In no way did I see the site potentially as a platform for Christian or for that matter any religious proselytizing. My personal exploration into the matter of miracles has run the gamut in terms of the disiplines I've consulted. In fact, I'm currently reading "Life After Death" by Deepak Chopra. I recommend it highly to all who visit this site. I think he's one of the most brilliant minds of our times. The book is endorsed by nine Ph.D's from all walks of life.
Having said that,I must say that your question basically supports one of the points I made as to the abundance of evidence regarding apparent miracles and the phenomenon that many like yourself are seemingly unaware of them. One that involves a cure for a nun which will support the canonization of John Paul II has recently been all over the news. For now, why don't you start with a miracles 101 site. You'll find it at: http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/pe2.htm. I personally viewed the site not as a Catholic but purely as an explorer after the truth regarding miracles.
Oh Bob. Bob. No. Deepak CHOPRA? C'mon, you were doing so well! Admiring the Deepak is basically an admission of gullibility.
He's been debunked over and over, he's displayed a failure to grasp fundamental aspects of the science he tries to talk about. He's either supernaturally ignorant or a complete fraud.
Here's one of many, many links, just to get you started:
http://scienceblogs.com/insolence/2006/10/the_trouble_with_deepak_chopr…
Thanks for the heads-up on the Deepak man, ST. In the area of science I'll take the "gullibility" label without the slightest hint of a blush. I appreciate the good-natured spirit in which you pinned that label on me though. I've made no effort to disguise the fact that,in the area of science I'm still playing little league ball. I'm about ten rungs down from dilettante level in this arena. You'll find my comments exclusively in the spiritual realm, notwithstanding the fact that I was unaware of the debunking of Deepak in your world. My great handicap is that at 60,I've only been on the net for two years.
I read the blogs you directed me to and came away impressed at the fluent discourse among those who participated. You'll never find me venturing beyond my competence level. You'll find my comments restricted to discussions dealing with theology. I'll never presume to dictate science to scientists. I've spent the better part of the last 25 years in the former discipline and feel I have something to contribute. My purpose in getting involved here is to share my knowledge in a positive way.
Again, thanks for the enlightenment on Deepak. I'll continue to explore with that in mind.