Is philosophy progressive? (Is science?)

Coincidentally, with my discussion of Peter van Inwagen's chapter on philosophical failure just past, comes a piece in Philosophy Now by Toni Carey, which asks if philosophy is progressive, which is another way of asking whether there is such a thing as philosophical success. Usually, and here also, philosophy is contrasted with science in this respect. It's nice to see the author has read and understood Hull's point that most science is not progressive, and that we have only got the basis for believing science progresses if we ignore the bulk of science which dies stillborn and is never heard of again. I wonder if we could say that philosophy has indeed made progress in the same manner. For example, physicalism is now a viable and vibrant metaphysical project, along with naturalising epistemology and ethics, which were options not available in older dialogue. So long as we ignore the bulk of philosophy, which plays word salad football, or which clings to older metaphysics out of religious commitment and a need for the security of tradition, we can say philosophy has progressed. That is to say, not really. Philosophy has widened its scope of available alternatives, but the old questions remain. This is something that is not true of science. One thing science can do that philosophy can't, is eliminate longstanding views once and for all.

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I've always thought of philosophy as the set of issues that exist on the periphery of rigorous knowledge. Science opens door for philosophers to discuss things and in turn philosophers often open up new intellectual pathways in our thinking. For instance, adaptive computation has demonstrated the efficacy of large-scale self-organizing systems, which would have been by and large regarded as mysticism in the 18th. century. Philosophers also have to wrestle with accommodating the quandaries presented by quantum behavior at the subatomic level, something that even the most daring philosopher wouldn't have postulated before the development of QM. It is in this sense that I think philosophy is progressive.

"It's nice to see the author has read and understood Hull's point that most science is not progressive, and that we have only got the basis for believing science progresses if we ignore the bulk of science which dies stillborn and is never heard of again."

Excuse my ignorance but who or what is Hull?

Whether or not a discipline progresses might depend on what one takes to be the "product." If, like me, you think philosophy is about framing questions with sufficient clarity to permit the rejection of facile answers, then I think philosophy has made quite a lot of progress. BTW, I view what has come to be called science as a part of philosophy so conceived -- with science focused on framing questions in a way that permits experience/experiment to contribute to the process.

By bob koepp (not verified) on 22 Jan 2007 #permalink

I'd second Bob. The fact most theories fail doesn't mean the process isn't progressive. If nothing else the fact things have been eliminated is a huge issue.

While philosophy, by its very nature, is much more open. I'd say it is progressive as well. Yes many potential views aren't absolutely shut out. But lots of arguments are shown to be problematic. And arguably, since philosophy must still be tied to the empirical, things progress there.

I think the analogy within science for philosophy might be the remnant of the anti-big bang folks and the anti-dark matter folks. Science has progressed in that there is, each year, less and less reason to reject the big bang. Arguably that was true in the 70's as well. Most scientists do accept the big bang as a fact. But they can't make an absolutely air tight argument against it. Dark matter is probably about where the big bang was in the late 60's or early 70's. I think at this stage most accept it to one degree or an other. But that slam dunk case hasn't been made.

The problem is that I think some people don't realize just how creative alternative theorists can be. While I'm no Kuhnian, I think some of his points certainly do apply equally to recent movement in science. Progress, without some sort of absolute standard, is kind of problematic. I think the approach to progress that the old scientific realists pushed is problematic. But I think science does reject ideas and so does philosophy. Say what you will, but Platonism just aint that popular anymore nor is Stoicism.

Forgive me if I am stating the obvious, but it seems to me the progress means change or movement towards a desired goal or objective and is thus a teleological process.

In a universe which is not the creation of a deity, such as seems to be the case with our own, there can be change but not progress as defined in any overall sense since there is no purpose to its existence. But that does not prevent intelligent agents such as ourselves from setting goals or objectives to attain and hence does not prevent us from achieving progress. A public health doctor in one of our nations, for example, might measure progress towards the goal of better health in the general population by a reduction in the incidence of endemic diseases or a decline in the rate of infant mortality. It might make no difference to the fate of the Universe but that is not the doctor's concern.

If a goal of science is the accumulation of more data about the natural world and the construction of models or theories which incorporate more of that data and are more accurate and detailed descriptions of that world, or some aspect of it, than those which preceded them, then science is capable of progress. The fact that many explanations are discarded along the way does not change that. It is inevitable. There are many possible explanations of the world but, if there is only one universe, there is ultimately only one true explanation. Moving from a position of complete ignorance to the construction of the ultimate explanation must involve the assembly of many tentative and provisional explanations which are tossed aside and replaced with newer and better models as their shortcomings become apparent. That does not disprove progress, it is the nature of progress - in both science and philosophy. To deny that would mean that attributing epileptic seizures to demonic possession is as true an explanation as the misfiring of neurons in the brain and I assume that is not what Hull means.

By Ian H Spedding FCD (not verified) on 24 Jan 2007 #permalink